Page -v- Smith [1995] 2 All ER 736 at 759, 761 per Lord Lloyd. All work is written to order. . Page, was involved in a minor car accident, and was physically unhurt in the collision. C brought an action in negligence (and/or breach of statutory duty) against their employer, the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (D), for . The boy sustained a very minor injury and the damage to his tricycle was nothing serious. In this case, the defendant was claimants son who had a car accident while he was negligently driving his car being drunk. The employer could have checked up on him during his . Do you have a 2:1 degree or higher? The accident took place when the victims car collided with the defendants lorry which was itself collided with another lorry. A rescuer or an employee suffering such psychiatric illness is also classified as a secondary victim (unless they are themselves endangered in the event). Is there any liability for self inflicted physical injury which caused the claimants psychiatric illness? . However, liability could not be avoided if the accident took place very close to him and was so horrific. Tel: 0795 457 9992, or email david@swarb.co.uk. This chapter considers the landmark decision in Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 concerning liability for psychiatric injury, or 'nervous shock'. 669. *595 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police. Free resources to assist you with your university studies! . I conclude by wholeheartedly agreeing with Lord Steyns statement that The Law on the recovery of compensation for pure psychiatric harm is a patchwork quilt of distinctions which are difficult to justify and I feel, the cases discussed in this essay clearly support my viewpoint. Lord Bridge in McLoughlin v OBrian required that a plaintiff must not merely suffer grief, distress or any other normal emotion, but a positive psychiatric illness. The relationship between the claimants and the deceased was described by the court as- Robertson was a person of fifty six years old who had known Smith for ages. << Another claimant of this case was Rough, who was forty four years old. Held: Psychiatric injury is a recognised form of personal injury, and no statute . Despite of establishing a close tie of love where the secondary victims fails to satisfy the requirement of proximity in time and place with the accident, the court will not entilte them to recover damages for psychiatric illness. [70] As per Griffith LJ [1981] 1 All ER 809 at page 829. CJ Keane criticized the logic of distinguishing between psychiatric illnesses resulting from a traumatic event as opposed to suffering grief in its aftermath. See para 1.5 n 14 below. The Plaintiff had a pre-existing chronic fatigue syndrome, which manifested itself from time . . He argued that, in Bourhills case, the fishwife was not entitled to recover damages for psychiatric illness since she did not see the actual accident at the time it took place but only saw the outcome of it afterwards. Prior to this, the initial response of the common law to claims relating to nervous shock, was to deny responsibility. Take a look at some weird laws from around the world! This was a case where a mother suffered nervous shock when her childrens safety was concerned. The . endstream endobj startxref Held: It was a classic case of nervous shock. In the case of Brice v Brown[4], hysterical personality disorder was considered to be a psychiatric injury. Registered office: Creative Tower, Fujairah, PO Box 4422, UAE. He drove her to the hospital where she saw her dead daughter, and her husband and two other children seriously injured, all still covered in oil and mud. The horrible accident took place when the employees were removing a big thin piece of metal sheeting which was lying on the south-bound carriageway. He was not a rescuer, and nor had . The claimants, as secondary victims, had to satisfy the criteria for the imposition of liability formulated by the House of Lords in McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 and Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] AC 310. Ibid, at 576. Looking for a flexible role? [39] As per Cazalet LJ. However in relation to claims brought by siblings this close relationship had to be proven by evidence. His brother in law and his nephew also had been present in the football ground who was watching the live match from the terrace. Lord Goff said: because shock in its nature is capable of affecting so wide a range of people, there is a real need for the law to place some limitation upon the extent of admissible claims. Hearing about it from someone else would not suffice. Employment > Health and safety; but the court dismissed their claims for damages, claiming that they did fulfill the criteria of rescuers. 2 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310. .Cited McLoughlin v Jones; McLoughlin v Grovers (a Firm) CA 2002 In deciding whether a duty of care is established the court must go to the battery of tests which the House of Lords has taught us to use, namely: . The distinction between primary and secondary victims is well worth noting. hb```R !1CFAFCFAAA KP`L%T98;00`8A$B*oAjb Like the case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, this case arose from the disaster that occurred at Hillsborough football stadium in Sheffield in the FA cup semi-final match between Liverpool and . HL dismissed their claims since they were suffering extreme grief, not a psychiatric illness. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this dissertation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of UKDiss.com. Lord Dyson MR felt that damages for psychiatric illness could not be recovered in respect of consequences witnessed months, and . It seems apparent from the Alcock case judgments that the court will only emphasize on close tie of love and affection before allowing any secondary victims to establish a claim and recover damages for psychiatric illness. Again this development of the proximity of relationship in this case seems quite unfair to some of the claimants who were seeking compensation as they would not have been aware previously of this .The principle of proximity of time and place was also applied in this case, where a claimant failed to recover. View history. Capacity plays a vital role in determining whether a person can exercise autonomy in making choices in all aspects of life, from simple decisions to far-reaching decisions such as Our academic writing and marking services can help you! To export a reference to this article please select a referencing stye below: UK law covers the laws and legislation of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. 5th Oct 2021 Cited Alcock and Others v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police HL 28-Nov-1991 The plaintiffs sought damages for nervous shock. Before making any decision, you must read the full case report and take professional advice as appropriate. Held: The claim failed: these claimants have no . Ninety six Liverpool fans were killed and many more seriously injured in a massive crush during the FA Cup Semi Final at Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield . endstream endobj 165 0 obj <> endobj 166 0 obj <>/MediaBox[0 0 594.72 841.68]/Parent 162 0 R/Resources<>/Font<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI]>>/Rotate 0/Tabs/S/Type/Page>> endobj 167 0 obj <>stream Different kinds of harm The horrific events of 15 April 1989 at the . More news from across Yorkshire 12 Pages. The injuries were psychiatric, being suffered when they witnessed a crash from the ground. The claim was rejected by the House of Lords on the basis that none of the claimants could be considered "primary . Although, Rough was driving another van but he came across the accident. The outcome of the Frost v Chief Constable Of South Yorkshire Police case, in which the House of Lords decided that the plaintiffs ( police officers) who, as a result of assisting the victims of the Hillsborough disaster ,which had been caused by negligence,( for which the Chief Constable was liable) , were not entitled to damages for nervous shock , either because their employment relationship gave rise to duties which were not owed to strangers, nor as rescuers , I feel gives credence to this statement by Lord Steyn . The court differentiated damage by fire from other types of physical damage to property for the purposes of liability in tort, saying We have come back to the plain . The reason for such unwillingness might be presumed that- the ordinary bystanders must be assumed to have sufficient strength or courage to undergo the calamities of modern life. The court further considered the issue if both the claimants suffered nervous shock as a result of witnessing the accident. Held: The general rules restricting the recovery of damages for . [66] Michaell A Jones, Liability for Psychiatric Illness More Principle, Less Subtlety? [1995] 4 Web JCLI. Only recognisable psychiatric illness would qualify for in such claims. Taylor v Somerset HA [1993] PIQR P 262 2. In Alcock v Chief Constable Of South shire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, 407, Lord Oliver introduced a broader classification of the primary victims as including those involved, either mediately or immediately or , as a participant in the event causing them psychiatric illness. Positive/Neutral Judicial Consideration . The outcome of this case is particularly note worthy. .Cited James-Bowen and Others v Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis SC 25-Jul-2018 The Court was asked whether the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (the Commissioner) owes a duty to her officers, in the conduct of proceedings against her based on their alleged misconduct, to take reasonable care to protect them from . No issues of. [20] Michaell A Jones, Liability for Psychiatric Illness More Principle, Less Subtlety? [1995] 4 Web JCLI. Pages 14 Course Hero uses AI to attempt to automatically extract content from documents to surface to you and others so you can study better, e.g., in search results, to enrich docs, and more. Facts. Held: Where an accident is of a particular . [14] Secondary Victims and Nervous Shock by M Dunne (2000) BR 383. Unless and until there is clear evidence of having the close relationship or a close tie of love with the person (primary victims) who is injured or within the zone of danger, the court will not allow any claims for psychiatric injury brought by the secondary victims. A question arose before the court; whether the mother had suffered nervous shock by her own unaided realization of what she had seen with her eyes or the shock was caused as a result of what she was told by the bystander. [50] stated that the present case is not a margianl one. 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However, as far as their claim for psychiatric illness was concerned, the court was neither convinced with the surrounding facts and circumstances that there was sufficient close tie of love and affection with the claimants and the primary victim nor was convinced that the psychiatric illness that they had sustained was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant in accordance with the recovery criteria for psychiatric illness established in the leading case of Alcock. . [17] As per Mr. Bankes, Atkin and Sargant L.JJ [1925] 1 K.B 141 at page 142. IMPORTANT:This site reports and summarizes cases. Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1991] UKHL 5, [1992] 1 AC 310 is a leading English tort law case on liability for nervous shock (psychiatric injury). One of the children had died due to sustaining severe physical injuries almost immediately. However the crash did result in a recurrence of magic encephalomyelitis (Chronic fatigue syndrome) from which he had suffered for 20 years but was then in remission. Up until the early 20th century in England, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for nervous shock. Primary victims are victims who are imperilled or reasonably believe themselves to be imperilled by the defendants negligence.Lord Steyn said: the law on the recovery of compensation for pure psychiatric harm is a patchwork quilt of distinctions which are difficult to justify. In the present case, the claimants family members including her husband and three children had a severe road accident. The Second Defendant relies on the view of the majority of the House of Lords in White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 (also known as Frost v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire) that, for a rescuer to be regarded as a primary victim, it must be shown that they were exposed to the risk of physical injury or reasonably . According to him, it is not necessary that such class of person, to whom the defendant owes liability, have to be spouse or parent and child. However, the trial judge, Boreham J[68], took the view that- although the claimant was a person of reasonable fortitude and the mental condition that she had suffered due to shock was different from mere grief and sorrow, but it was held that the defendant was not liable for causing psychiatric injury to her because it was not reasonably foreseeable. . Frost v Chief Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3 WLR 1194. He suffered a mental breakdown in 1986, and had four months off work. He suffered only psychiatric injury. However, after couple of hours he received a phone call from someone and learnt that both his brothers got killed at the disaster. The House of Lords (by a majority) in Page v Smith, enhanced the recovery of the primary victim over the secondary victim. %%EOF Potential claims of misfeasance in public office and libel might also be considered. Since they were not endangered in the discharge of their service or in rescuing, as employees and/or rescuers, the police officers were only secondary victims. Three were on duty at the ground itself; one had attempted to free spectators while the other two had attended the makeshift morgue in the gymnasium. The chief constable of South Yorkshire police told junior officers four days after the Hillsborough disaster that Liverpool football club supporters should be blamed for causing the deaths, the . He further considered that, such a proximity relationship or close tie of love and affection might exist between the family members or friends. [36] As per Lord Hope [1995]S. C at page 364. The winner - given the power to fire the next chief constable - will inevitably prevail on an anti-corruption ticket. So, it is the secondary victims who are required to prove the fact that he has sustained a psychiatric injury because the person with whom he is in a close relationship has in fact suffered from a severe physical injury.
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